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Rule of Law in the Philippines: 
The Reproductive Logic of Elite Democracy*1
Fernando P. Gonzaga
AbsTRAcT
confronted by mounting allegations of corruption, electoral fraud, and 
abuse of executive power, the government of Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010) called on critics and demonstrators to 
cease their dissent and uphold the “rule of law.” Amid this unsettling void 
in political authority, the Philippine supreme court used its judicial power 
to promulgate rules that would enforce the “human rights” of citizens. by 
analyzing the speeches of President Arroyo and supreme court chief 
Justice Reynato s. Puno (2006–2010), the paper will examine how this 
dynamic plays out on the terrain of signification, where large political 
bodies, which claim to speak for the multitude of Filipinos, struggle over 
the parameters of sovereign power or the idea of what the government 
“should do” and “cannot do.”
KEywoRDs: Philippine politics, Arroyo, supreme court, sovereign 
power, human rights, extrajudicial killings
For most of the initial decade of the twenty-first century, the Philippines 
was said to be living under the pall of impunity, haunted by the specter of 
a justice that was perpetually withheld. From Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s 
ascension to the Presidency in January 2001 to the conclusion of her term 
of office in June 2010, political activists and news journalists were killed in 
increasing numbers, often in broad daylight and by assailants who were never 
caught or convicted. Although the Arroyo administration in its official rhetoric 
condemned these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, it also 
1*This paper was presented at the 11th Annual Cornell University Southeast Asia Program 
Graduate Student Conference in October 2008.
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refrained from acting decisively. It instead devoted its energies and resources 
to combating allegations of corruption, electoral fraud, and abuse of executive 
power, frequently calling for its opponents to cease their dissent and uphold 
the “rule of law.” To fill this apparent political void, in which the state failed to 
protect the “life, liberty, and security” of the populace, the Philippine Supreme 
Court adopted an expanded notion of its judicial power in 2007 to promulgate 
rules that would enforce the “human rights” of citizens against the abuse of 
sovereign power. The default reaction of the press and the populace was to 
laud the Supreme Court and its judicial activism for saving Philippine democ-
racy; however, the implications of these actions were actually contrary.
Previous studies on authoritarianism in the Philippine political sphere 
had dwelt on the autocratic actions of public officials. An example would be 
Alfred McCoy’s essay in the volume Philippine Colonial Democracy on the para-
digmatic despotism of Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. Few studies 
interrogate how, in an elite democracy like that of the Philippines, the work-
ings of authoritarianism can extend beyond the individual and organizational 
dimension of presidential decree or state violence. It is this dynamic that I 
aim to study, namely, how the sphere of democratic action in the Philippines 
translates to the conflict among large political bodies that claim to speak for 
the multitude of Filipinos. Seeing the activities of the state as merely part 
of the operations of symbolic governmentality, I would like to explore how 
resistance against the state can affirm the established order. Through a close 
reading of the speeches of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, I will examine how this dynamic plays 
out on the terrain of signification and affect. This is where the Philippine state 
and Supreme Court struggle over the parameters of executive or sovereign 
power, and over the idea of what the government cannot do and should do. 
In January 2001, the constitutional successor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo be-
came President of the Republic of the Philippines when a non-violent, popular 
uprising called “EDSA Dos” or “People Power II” ousted the incompetent and 
corrupt incumbent. Since that moment, however, the Arroyo administration 
itself repeatedly faced allegations of corruption and abuse of power. It was 
accused of overpricing infrastructure projects, such as the P1.1-billion ($26-
million) Diosdado Macapagal Highway, $503-million North Luzon Railway, 
and $326-million National Broadband Network, and of using public funds 
such as the Department of Agriculture’s P728-million ($17.3-million) fertilizer 
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fund for Arroyo’s reelection campaign. Aside from being involved in several 
of these deals, Arroyo’s husband and sons were also accused of laundering 
money from illegal gambling operations.
In June 2005 there emerged tapes of wiretapped phone conversations be-
tween Arroyo and a Commission on Elections commissioner during the 2004 
national elections; these showed the latter assuring Arroyo of her winning 
margin. The majority of her cabinet members resigned and joined the chorus 
of opposition politicians, civil society groups, and leftist organizations that 
rallied on the streets to demand for her ouster. Due to this threat of another 
People Power uprising, combined with surveys consistently showing its wide-
spread unpopularity, the Arroyo administration resorted to illicit means to 
ensure its survival. It rewarded loyal friends and allies, even those allegedly 
involved in corruption and electoral fraud, with administrative positions. It 
bribed members of Congress so that impeachment cases filed against Arroyo 
were dismissed as “insufficient in substance.” Equating all progressive civil 
society actors with “communists,” Arroyo vilified her opponents as “enemies 
of the state.”
With the protests against her administration continuing unabated, Ar-
royo adopted a Calibrated Preemptive Response policy in September 2005, 
which enabled the police to break up large assemblies of people. This policy 
was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In response to 
Senate inquiries into the different allegations, she issued Executive Order 
464, which required cabinet members summoned before Congress to seek 
“prior consent” from the Office of the President before divulging “confidential 
or classified information” that could hinder state security or public interest. 
While presented as a way of protecting the rights of public officials and the 
principle of separation of the executive and legislative branches, it only less-
ened government transparency and accountability.
When disgruntled military officers and soldiers were caught planning 
to join the organized protests on the 20th anniversary of the February 1986 
People Power revolt, Arroyo declared a State of National Emergency with 
Presidential Proclamation 1017, claiming to have uncovered a conspiracy 
between the extreme left and extreme right to stage a coup d’état. She de-
nounced the actions of her opponents for hampering the economy, aiding 
in the overthrow of democracy, and “sabotaging the people’s confidence 
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in government and their faith in the future of this country.” In blaming the 
national media for “recklessly magni[fying]” the situation, she recognized 
the potency of signification and representation in shaping public opinion 
and the need to control them. PP 1017, whose explicit purpose was to quell 
insurrection or rebellion and “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all 
decrees, order and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my 
direction,” temporarily granted the state the unconditional authority to arrest 
opposition leaders and militant leftists as well as to close news bureaus that 
failed to regulate their content according to the administration’s guidelines 
for responsible journalism. The Supreme Court later ruled that such actions 
by the state were unconstitutional.
State inaction likewise worked to suppress dissent, such as in the case 
of the Arroyo administration’s hesitance to act decisively on the problem 
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. According to Philip 
Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions who visited to the Philippines to investigate, these 
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances clearly were planned with 
the intent to sow fear in dissenters (6); in effect, “narrow[ing] the country’s 
political discourse” (Alston 8). His report highlighted the seemingly coinci-
dental link between these killings and disappearances and the state’s counter-
insurgency operations. For example, the report described how, in Nueva Ecija, 
Central Luzon, the Armed Forces of the Philippines occupied a barangay (the 
smallest administrative unit in the Philippines and the modern equivalent of 
the pre-colonial barrio) and attempted to identify the members of the civil 
society groups working there, which it uncritically considered to be fronts 
for the Communist Party of the Philippines. After constructing an “order of 
battle,” the AFP interrogated individuals named on this list and ordered them 
to surrender, all without without the assumption of innocence. Many of the 
individuals listed in the “order of battle” disappeared or are killed.
The Arroyo administration tried to deal with the challenges to its contin-
ued rule by relying on the consolidation of support from its political allies, 
on the application of the law and of violence against combative opponents, 
and on the manipulation of symbols to stop ambivalent citizens from form-
ing a collectivity that could topple the state. To preserve itself, the Arroyo 
administration needed to contain the force—People Power—that established 
its rule in the first place.
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The Arroyo administration attempted to restrict the political action of the 
population to non-subversive areas by deploying the police and re-inscribing 
the law. The media and anti-administration elements condemned these efforts 
as being despotic, while the Supreme Court ruled them to be unconstitutional. 
Due to the prevailing negative attitude towards unsanctioned state violence, 
the Arroyo administration had to carefully negotiate the thin perceptual 
boundary between justified use and blatant abuse of sovereign power. Its 
response was constrained by the current global political landscape, which is 
shaped by social media, the presence of transnational organizations, and the 
general concern for human rights. Unsanctioned state violence no longer had 
legitimacy in the public discourse engendered by this political landscape. Fili-
pinos still bore the trauma from the Martial Law regime of Ferdinand Marcos, 
in which a curfew was imposed, the press was closed, businesses were seized, 
and dissenters were imprisoned, tortured, and had disappeared. 
Surveys consistently showed that a large majority of Filipinos were dissat-
isfied with Arroyo’s presidency. To prevent this dissatisfaction from translat-
ing into widespread demonstrations that could include typically unengaged 
sectors of Philippine society such as the business community, the Church 
hierarchy, and the urban middle class, the Arroyo administration turned to 
subtler means of control that worked on the subconscious and affective levels. 
Elizabeth Povinelli has written about how the contemporary multicultural 
Australian state invoked the popular shame over the injustice of a colonial past 
to summon a national-collective will. In a similar vein, the Arroyo administra-
tion drew on the moral and emotional connotations of the rhetoric of the “rule 
of law” to confrontchallenges to its survival, although its aim was to prevent 
a national-collective will from developing into a potent counterforce.
In one important speech in June 2005 that responded to former President 
Corazon Aquino’s call for Arroyo to resign voluntarily due to allegations of 
electoral fraud, Arroyo stressed the urgency “to move away from political 
bickering to doing what the people of the Philippines expect their leaders to 
do and that is get our economy moving and ensure the delivery of essential 
services” (Arroyo, “PGMA…resignation”). Claiming to be speaking in the best 
interest of the nation, she assumed to know what the majority of Filipinos 
want from those whom they have tasked with directing the country. This prac-
tice of interpreting the desires of the multitude as the interests of the majority 
could also be found in her speech in November 2007 when military officers 
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on trial for rebellion, along with a few opposition politicians, barricaded a 
deluxe hotel in Makati City:
It is clear that the actions of those few desperate men reveal just how out of 
touch they are with the hopes and dreams of the average Filipino. Filipinos 
want political stability, a bright economic future and social justice. The ac-
tions of those misguided men undermine each and every one of the genuine 
aspirations of real Filipinos. Instead of working to bring together the nation 
by working within our democratic process, their actions merely are fuel for 
selfish motives for personal gain. (Arroyo, “President…Armed Forces”)
Again, she claimed to know without any error in interpretation all the “genu-
ine” “hopes and dreams” of “average” or “real Filipinos,” which her “mis-
guided” and “desperate” opponents were “out of touch” with and therefore 
ended up “undermin[ing].” She presented this picture of herself as having had 
overcome a supposed communication gap between the people and their lead-
ers, which is a fundamental concern in representative democracy. In referring 
to the rest of the population as “real Filipinos,” she was suggesting that unlike 
her, the political actors who opposed her administration were ensnared in 
a narcissistic fantasy. Lumping them together with other dissenters, armed 
communists, and terrorists, she tried to deflect the blame for the country’s 
problems to this aggregate of her opponents. The contrast made between 
their selfishness and her concern for the principles of democracy and the 
interests of the majority illustrates that political authority issues in part from 
the legitimacy to speak for the multitude.
Here, as in other speeches, Arroyo repeatedly emphasized the significance 
of the economy, which she called “the people’s business” (Arroyo, “PGMA…res-
ignation”). She claimed that her administration had successfuly managed this 
and the proof was the rise in Gross Domestic Products (GDP), a robust cur-
rency, and growth in foreign investments. Shaping the public perception of the 
country’s economic performance was a tool to mitigate dissent.She viewed that 
the state’s tasks were to stimulate economic progress and to provide basic ser-
vices to its citizens (Arroyo, “PGMA…resignation”). In establishing an integral 
link between the progress of the Philippine economy and the improvement of 
the lives of Filipinos, she posited that those who hindered economic progress 
were consequently ruining the lives of the majority. When she declared that 
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Filipinos desired economic progress above all, she was implying that illegal 
activities such as corruption, electoral fraud, and abuse of power were excus-
able as long as the two tasks of the state were met. Repeatedly emphasizing 
the significance of the economy allowed her to tap into the shame felt by 
many that the country is being left behind by its Southeast Asian neighbors, 
into the mythic nostalgia that the economy before Martial Law was second 
only in Asia to Japan’s, and into the idealistic aspiration that the Philippines 
can develop into a First World country. To prove that the national economy 
was performing well under her administration, she constantly cited govern-
ment statistics. These quantitative interpretations of the material conditions 
of existence were based on her administration’s own economic measures. In 
lamenting the nation’s wasted potential—what Filipino writers have called its 
“embarrassment of riches”—Arroyo underscored that the country should not 
allow its current political troubles to spoil the opportunity it had at that very 
moment to prosper (Arroyo, “PGMA…Peace Rally”). In this way, the telos of 
economic progress had become the sole concern for the country’s future, and 
the Arroyo administration alone possessed the means to achieve this .
In her June 2005 response to the clamor for her resignation, Arroyo 
characterized the actions of protestors as “caus[ing] deep and grievous harm 
to the nation because they undermine our democratic principles and the 
very foundation of our constitution. Once again, we’re subverting the rule 
of law and perpetuating a system that’s broken” (Arroyo, “PGMA…resigna-
tion”). She considered these protestors to be nothing but “destabilizers” and 
“troublemakers” and their dissent to be simply “political bickering,” an insur-
mountable barrier that she equated with the “broken” political system that 
kept the economy from “moving” (Arroyo, “PGMA…resignation”), impeded 
the prosperity of the people (Arroyo, “PGMA…Barangay”), and jeopardized 
the future of the country. She quipped: “walang mangyayari kung papayagan 
nating manggulo ang mga nanggugulo [nothing will be accomplished if we 
allow the troublemakers to cause trouble]” (Arroyo, “PGMA…Barangay”). By 
denouncing the broken political system, she gave the impression that she and 
her administration stand apart from it and can therefore be spared from any 
changes to the political system. In the same speech, in which she congratu-
lated barangay officials for their steadfast support of her administration in 
the midst of its crises, she pleaded for the country to focus and to unite: “Ang 
kinabukasan ng ating bansa, the future of our country, lies in our unwaver-
ing focus. Dapat nakatutok tayo. Dapat determinado tayo to apply the rule 
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of law… [The future of our country lies in our unwavering focus. We should 
be focused. We should be determined to apply the rule of law…]” (Arroyo, 
“PGMA…Barangay”). Through these links in signification, the future of the 
country seemed to depend on the absence of troublesome dissent, which 
was tied to the application of the rule of law. The supposed link between the 
country’s future and political acquiescence could likewise be seen in another 
speech from 2005. Arroyo reacted to the Senate’s decision to continue its 
investigations into electoral fraud despite the House of Representatives’ dis-
missal of the impeachment case against her. Evoking a Manichean narrative 
of stark contrasts, she imagined two different “Philippines’”: one “poised for 
economic take-off” and the other beset by a “poisoned political system” (Ar-
royo, “PGMA…Kaanak”). Caught in this fallacy of false dilemma, dissent is 
equated with a self-serving lust for power, and therefore is always a hindrance 
to economic progress.
Arroyo rebuked dissenters not only for obstructing the work of the gov-
ernment and the economy but also for subverting the rule of law and the 
principles of democracy, both of which remained undefined abstractions. 
According to her interpretation of political reality, these people had “deep[ly] 
and grievous[ly]” wounded the nation (Arroyo, “PGMA…resignation”) as 
though it were an organism that could be hurt. Such a vivid image allowed 
Arroyo to elicit sympathy for her administration and anger against her op-
ponents. Through a series of associations, she tried to establish that freedom 
and democracy would not thrive without the constitution and the law (Arroyo, 
“PGMA…resignation”; Arroyo, “PGMA…Peace Rally”): “This is a democracy 
that’s held together by the Constitution and the rule of law. The Philippines 
has fallen into a dangerous pattern where the answer to every crisis is to 
subvert due process rather than work within the system. This must stop” (Ar-
royo, “PGMA…resignation”). Arroyo fashioned a picture of the Philippines as 
a tragic nation trapped in the “dangerous” repetition of history where crises 
are resolved by disregarding the established legal and political system. This 
picture was meant to exploit the new wariness of Filipinos about People Power 
uprisings, which had simply substituted one set of traditional politicians for 
another without transforming the dominant political and social order.
Arroyo asked her opponents to allow “due process” to work and the “rule 
of law” to prevail, instead of demonstrating on the streets and demanding 
for her resignation, which she viewed as actions that could wreck political 
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institutions and cause widespread chaos. Arroyo asserted that in a democracy, 
“natural lang ang magkatalong pananaw at posisyon” [conflicting views and 
positions are natural]. Conflicting views and positions are supposedly accept-
able within the democratic space as long as they can be settled peacefully. 
When they cannot be settled peacefully, the courts are there to deal with them 
(Arroyo, “PGMA…NEDA”). This idea of democracy sees the exercise of power 
as occuring through discussion, the failure of which only transfers political 
action to the juridical arena. Democracy has definite bounds circumscribed 
by constitutional law that prevents it from dissolving into chaos. The Arroyo 
administration deployed this argument to convince its opponents to halt their 
demonstrations and wait for the impeachment process in Congress to unfold. 
By being restricted to language and legality the exercise of power could not 
threaten the state.
When Arroyo’s allies dismissed the impeachment case against her as 
“insufficient in substance” without even seeing the evidence, they closed off 
a crucial constitutional recourse. As new allegations about the Arroyo ad-
ministration’s purported illegal activities surfaced, the street demonstrations 
continued and the Senate opened investigations into these accusations. When 
her critics made allegations that a contract with the Chinese government to 
develop a national broadband network was ridden with “kickbacks,” Arroyo 
responded by accusing them of peddling baseless fabrications: “Ang paglilitis 
hindi dinadaan sa tsismis. Ang paglilitis dinadaan sa ebidensiya. Merong 
sapat, merong karapat-dapat na korte para doon” [Trials should not be based 
on gossip. Trials should be based on evidence. There are enough mechanisms 
for that. There is a proper court for that] (Arroyo, “PGMA…Peace Rally”). She 
suggested that instead of disrupting the routines of society with demonstra-
tions or wasting the resources of the legislature on investigations, they should 
acquiesce because the appropriate political and legal mechanisms for han-
dling these problems were already in place. In a similar speech in September 
2005 explaining why she must “put [her] foot down” and ban protestors from 
gathering in public and cabinet officials from appearing before Congress, she 
averred that Senate inquiries were being done in aid not of legislation but 
of“destabilization,” through “speculation, hearsay and half-truth,” and that 
the government was being “disabled by the politics of insult” by “those who 
want to grab power” (Arroyo, “PGMA…Kaanak”). The Arroyo administration, 
using the desire among the populace for democratic political institutions to 
function as they would in First World countries, reshaped the signification 
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of the rule of law for the purposes of preserving the state. This logic of politi-
cal survival assumed that establishing the rule of law meant ignoring all the 
allegations against the administration so that the state could concentrate on 
its principal task of managing the economy. Upholding the rule of law meant 
permitting Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to finish her term as President without 
holding her administration accountable for any of its alleged abuses.
The Arroyo administration reduced People Power to the plane of significa-
tion in order to avoid its impact. Appealing to the pride, shame, and frustra-
tion felt by Filipinos regarding their country and its current situation, Arroyo 
argued in a speech she delivered on the anniversary of the 1986 People Power 
uprising that the change in government her opponents wanted to bring about 
through another People Power uprising would only damage the country’s 
international reputation:
Yung mundo pinagdiriwang ang Edsa 1. Yung mundo pinayagan ang Edsa 
2. Yung mundo hindi patatawarin ang Edsa 3. Sasabihin ng mundo, ano ba 
yang Pilipinas? Pinakamagaling na manggagawa sa buong mundo kaya hina-
hanap sa buong mundo tapos parating binabaril ang sarili at hindi matatag? 
Kung ganon, sino ang darating na investor dito? [The world celebrated Edsa 
1. The world tolerated Edsa 2. The world will not forgive us for Edsa 3. The 
world will say, what’s wrong with the Philippines? Because its workers are the 
best in the entire world, they are sought after by the entire world. But then it 
always shoots itself and does not stand firm. If that’s the case, which investor 
would want to come here?]. (Arroyo, “PGMA…Peace Rally”)
Dissent became the scapegoat that must be expelled from the democratic 
space so that the foreign investors, upon which the Philippine economy relies 
heavily, would not be frightened away. Investors were pictured to be seeking 
the rule of law (Arroyo, “PGMA…NEDA”) and an environment suitable for 
business, which meant no market fluctuations caused by political turmoil. Ar-
royo thus claimed to speak not only for the Philippine population but also for 
the foreign community, with which she supposedly had intimate ties because 
she was the head of state. In declaring that the true spirit of People Power is 
expressed in the principles of democracy and the rule of law, she attempted 
to contain its potential for revolutionary action within abstractions such as 
freedom, democracy, and law.
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In assuming that People Power is a legacy of the heroes of the Philippine 
Revolution who devoted their lives to unite the nation and fight for its inde-
pendence, the Arroyo administration accused its critics of of degrading their 
memory and sacrifice. Addressing a brotherhood of patriots, she praised the 
group for exemplifying the virtue of love for nation, which was in stark con-
trast to her opponents: “Talagang importante na yung pagmamahal sa ating 
bayan bilang isang bansa, nationhood, ay hindi lamang nandoon sa inyong 
mga ninuno, hanggang sa inyo, hanggang dapat sa mga dumarating na henera-
syon. [It is truly important that love for our people as a nation was not merely 
present in your ancestors, but should continue to be present in you and in 
future generations.]” (Arroyo, “PGMA…Kaanak”). She envisioned a community 
of love and patriotism that included the heroes of the Philippine Revolution; 
those who continued to dissent were excluding themselves from this.
The Arroyo administration, by employing techniques of signification that 
linked popular dissent with economic and political degradation, turned the 
country’s troubling conditions into a trauma that could only be overcome by 
entrusting the government. Arroyo’s speeches employed certain assumptions, 
about how the national economy functioned, that entailed the need to enforce 
the rule of law in order to assure economic productivity. This meant that the 
government must project to the world a tranquil image of Philippine politics 
with no noticeable dissatisfaction and dissent. This involved allowing the 
system to work even if a significant number of the populace continued to be 
marginalized and oppressed. These techniques of signification severed the 
bond between affect and action and transferred political responsibility from 
the Filipino multitude to their elected government.
Similar to President Arroyo, the Philippine Supreme Court also harnessed 
the potency of signification to redefine its role in government. Given that in 
the Philippines the President has the authority to appoint justices without 
seeking the approval of Congress, many perceive the Supreme Court to simply 
be an extension of the executive branch. Such was the case during the Marcos 
dictatorship, when the Supreme Court legally affirmed Marcos’ implementa-
tion of Martial Law and his changes to the Philippine Constitution, thereby 
legitimizing his rule. Despite unequivocal reports from the United Nations, 
the European Commission, and Amnesty International that held the Philip-
pine government accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disap-
pearances of activists and journalists, neither the state nor the congress were 
28
Fernando P. Gonzaga, “Rule of Law in the Philippines: The Reproductive Logic of Elite Democracy”
willing to act decisively against these acts. To compensate for this seeming 
political void, the Supreme Court expanded its notion of judicial power, which 
Alexis de Tocqueville defined as “the right of the judges to found their deci-
sions on the constitution rather than on the laws” (qtd. in Kommers 53). By 
upholding the principle of judicial review, which balances the exercise of power 
among the different branches of the Philippines’ American-style political 
system, the Supreme Court supposedly provided a counterforce against the 
abuse of power by the state. According to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno the 
1987 Constitution granted the Philippine judiciary “more muscular strength 
in dealing with the non-use, misuse, and abuse of authority in government” 
(Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 3). Article VIII, Section 1 of the Consti-
tution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual con-
troversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, 
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion 
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or 
instrumentality of the Government.
This expanded notion of judicial authority meant that constitutional rights 
were no longer merely “declaratory” in character but to be “enforced” in prac-
tice (Bernas). Section 5 enabled the judiciary to promulgate rules or laws that 
would protect and enforce such rights, a power that had previously been re-
served only for legislature. The Supreme Court used its new judicial power as 
a means to strengthen the justice system, to demand from the government “a 
high standard of official conduct,” and to combat the culture of impunity that 
had afflicted the country (Puno, “No Turning Back” 3). This Supreme Court, 
organized a National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and En-
forced Disappearances in July 2007 and afterwards crafted rules for the writ of 
amparo, though it did not have any explicit statutory support in the Constitu-
tion. In contrast to the writ of habeas corpus, which entails the production of 
a human body that officials may claim not to have in their custody, the writ 
of amparo makes it an obligation for the government to perform actively its 
constitutional duty of protecting and enforcing democratic rights.
In its rules, the writ of amparo is depicted as a powerful legal recourse that 
can grant deliverance to those who have no other recourse, “a remedy available 
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to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened 
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, 
or of a private individual or entity.” Specifying that the writ is applicable not 
only to acts but also to threats and omissions, the rules highlight omissions 
by public officials or employees. In other words, the writ is designed to ad-
dress the failure to perform the duties of government. The rules of the writ of 
amparo also distinguish between “public officials and employees” and “private 
individuals and entities” as though the public sphere where politics occurs 
were the sole responsibility of the government, while the private sphere which 
individuals inhabit were insulated from politics to enable them to pursue life, 
liberty, and security unfettered. Here, the boundary that separates the public 
from the private is not a matter of community and individual; it is rather the 
point at which the political passes into the non-political or apolitical.
The writ requires the government to describe the “steps and actions” 
(Philippine Supreme Court 5) it has taken to investigate the unlawful act, 
threat, or omission as well as the “manner and conduct” of the investigation 
(Philippine Supreme Court 3). All the information and evidence in the pos-
session of the government must be presented to the court. Unlike private 
individuals who are expected to demonstrate only “ordinary diligence,” public 
officials must prove that they have exercised “extraordinary diligence” in the 
conduct of their duty (Philippine Supreme Court 11). Public officials cannot 
escape accountability due to the inclusion of anticipatory mechanisms that 
prevent them from delaying the legal process or submitting a blanket denial. 
Enabling citizens to hold the government accountable for its actions, the 
rights claim enacted by the writ of amparo becomes the means by which the 
multitude can recuperate their idea about the possibilities of government. It 
is the opening through which they can found the conditions for a new politi-
cal community where the contractual relations between the citizens and the 
state would work democratically. However, rights claims are not necessarily 
emancipatory, Wendy Brown argues, but are rather more ambivalent in that 
their character depends on the specific networks of power in which they are 
applied. Concentrating attention and resources on holding the government 
accountable places the responsibility for protecting and enforcing the auton-
omy of individuals in the state and the judiciary. Enclosed within the private 
sphere, where they can freely pursue their interests, citizens relinquish their 
capacity for political action to their elected representatives and public officials. 
While the efforts made by the Supreme Court to reinforce rights claims may 
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appear to emancipate the multitude from the force of sovereign power, these 
efforts may actually achieve the opposite outcome, as can be discerned in the 
speeches of Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
In a speech regarding the Supreme Court’s defense of the freedom of the 
press against the threat of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, 
Chief Justice Puno stressed the urgency of confronting the culture of impu-
nity: “Unless and until we do something to submerge this pernicious culture, 
these attacks will continue to litter our collective consciousness with corpses 
of people who are bearers of truth” (Puno, “Freedom of the Press” 1). The truth 
inscribed in the bodies of witnesses is rendered mute when these witnesses 
are mercilessly killed. Without justice, their “corpses” remain visible in the 
public imagination, but any access to the truth they bear is refused. Only 
through the Supreme Court’s deliverance will individuals be able to excavate 
the truth and carve out a democratic space in the “collective consciousness.” 
The we “who can do something” refers to “the advocates, experts, journal-
ists, and jurists coming from all over the world who share the same concern 
over the rampant human rights violations around us” (Puno, “Freedom of 
the Press” 1) and not to the multitude of Filipinos against whom these viola-
tions are being committed. It is the task of the former and not the latter “to 
strengthen democracy.” With the multitude of Filipinos being portrayed as 
powerless, political action seems to be limited to the intervention of “the 
advocates, experts, journalists, and jurists.”
Like Arroyo, Puno creates the impression that the Supreme Court stands 
above the broken political system and can be the one tasked with bringing it 
into proper order. This compelling image is evident in the very first sentence 
of “The View from the Mountaintop,” his opening speech at the National 
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances, 
with the first-person I’s Promethean act of “blowing the trumpet call” for the 
Summit (Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 1). The “mountaintop” is sup-
posed to be the vantage point from which the members of the summit can 
address the problem “above our prejudices, above our predilections, above 
our prejudgments” (Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 6) and maybe even 
above politics. These lines imply in their phrasing that the participants of the 
Summit—the political actors in the Philippines who wield the power to make 
changes in the order of things—are not part of the problem and can therefore 
deal with it objectively and effectively. Although depicted as a democratic 
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space free from politics and opportunism, where members of the elite can 
act in the best interests of the multitude of Filipinos, the mountaintop could 
actually be the transcendent battleground where the real political actors and 
factions fight each other for the authority to control the country’s resources. 
According to this conception of Philippine democracy, the exercise of power 
is restricted to larger institutional bodies—to governmental representatives 
designated to stand in for the majority when it is the multitude themselves 
who should be engaged in political action.
With no other political actor or institution capable of intervening in the 
same manner, deliverance from the “pernicious” problem of extrajudicial 
killings and enforced disappearances is to be found in the power of the ju-
diciary. For Puno, the new role given to the judiciary by the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution of protecting and enforcing constitutional rights involves a 
“revolutionary” (qtd. in Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 3) transforma-
tion of the Supreme Court “from passivity to activism” (Puno, “View from 
the Mountaintop” 3). Unlike elected officials, who are held captive by their 
constituencies and dedicate their resources and actions to their reelection, the 
judiciary is “politically independent” (Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 5), 
a claim that consequently masks how the legal system is nonetheless part of 
a larger network of domination.
Puno’s speeches celebrate human rights as being “the last bulwark” in 
the defense of Philippine democracy (Puno, “No Turning Back” 2), an idea 
that illustrates how the expectations of the Philippine government have di-
minished to the point where rights claims have become the only recourse left 
for terrorized individuals. All those who disregard the value of human rights 
are likewise debased as being cowardly or apathetic and therefore politically 
and historically insignificant: “They who seek to remain in the safety of the 
sidelines when human rights are under assault shall be condemned by history 
to irrelevance” (Puno, “View from the Mountaintop” 6). More than that, the 
speeches explicitly deify human rights, in the transcendent capacity of which 
the multitude must rest their absolute faith and surrender their concrete au-
tonomy: “we are affirming our belief in human rights not only in the abstract; 
we are affirming that before the universal altar of human rights there can be 
no atheism, nor agnosticism on our part” (Puno, “View from the Mountain-
top” 2). In meticulously establishing the historical continuity of human rights 
in his speeches, Puno gives human rights the weight of something that has 
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evolved organically not unlike a living being. Human rights are immutable 
and sacred, being also guaranteed by positive law. Because they possess cur-
rency in the eyes of an international community that advocates democracy, 
their protection and enforcement can serve to enhance the Philippines’ global 
reputation as it strives to become a First World country.
Making human rights claims, however, involves an appeal to a transcen-
dent authority that circumscribes how individuals should behave and act. 
Talal Asad asserts that rights claims affirm the authority of the state when 
they seek the intervention of the executive branch in defending human rights. 
Correspondingly, rights claims affirm the authority of the judiciary when 
they depend on the legal system to demand action from the state. According 
to this temporal configuration, the exercise of power is constrained to the 
filing of rights claims—to the inscription of the visibility of disappearance 
and death in the legal record. While corpses are rendered visible, other reali-
ties are naturalized and concealed. Focusing on the urgency to enforce and 
protect the constitutional rights of individuals against the abuse of power of 
the state effectively abstracts politics from the unequal social and economic 
relations that prevail in the Philippines and the conditions that produce and 
reproduce these relations (Brown 114). In her reading of Marx’s “On the Jew-
ish Question,” Wendy Brown contrasts represented freedom and actual freedom, 
which she equates with the contrast between emancipation and liberation. She 
explains that when the state emancipates an individual from a constraint to 
his autonomy, it only abstracts him from the conditions that produced this 
constraint instead of liberating him from them. The process that resolves in 
his mind his “relative lack of freedom, equality, and community” reduces his 
actual freedom to “idealist” “pronouncements of freedom,” or in other words, to 
an empty signifier (Brown 105). The state grants him represented freedom, while 
abandoning him “to the actual powers that construct, buffet, and subject him” 
(Brown 107). The desire for autonomy is displaced into the rights-granting 
mechanisms of government as the government becomes , to paraphrase 
Marx, “the intermediary” between the multitude and their autonomy (Marx 
qtd. in Brown 106). To echo Brown, what the state therefore protects and 
enforce are not the actual life, liberty, and security of the multitude but their 
circumscribed rights to life, liberty, and security. The state and the law set the 
terms by which the exercise of power may take place, giving the impression 
of democracy but in fact containing political action within the parameters of 
the established order.
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The belief that the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disap-
pearances, which are the “spectral remains of the Martial Law regime” (Puno, 
“Writ of Habeas Data” 7), can be surmounted by countervailing the force of 
sovereign power has led to the misconception that the country exists in a 
sacred democratic space that must be defended against structures of tyranny. 
Although the state has been condemned for its tendency to abuse its monopoly 
over violence, the effects of domination that appear to emanate from it are not 
limited to its operations. According to Timothy Mitchell, the state-effect, which 
is the perception of the state as the rational source of domination, is actually 
part of the system of means by which the established order is maintained. 
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller explain that the different political and social 
institutions and processes are interconnected in a field of governmentality, 
the network of power in which the practices, discourses, and mechanisms 
by which a population and its productive capacities are managed. To avoid 
confusion, this configuration could be better understood under the name 
symbolic governmentality, in which the entire play of forces and trajectories in 
the political sphere, including the circulation of signs and affects, results in 
the reproduction and perpetuation of the established order. Instead of saving 
Philippine democracy and liberating the Filipino multitude by contesting the 
authority of the executive branch, the efforts of the Supreme Court to protect 
and enforce the human rights of citizens merely work to re-inscribe dissent 
within the prevailing system of domination and exploitation.
The principle of judicial review exercised by the Philippine Supreme 
Court is tied to the concept of limited government, which entails that power not 
be concentrated in a single individual or institution but dispersed among 
the three branches of government in an American-style political model—the 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial—through a system of checks and 
balances (Kommers 54). Instead of limiting or preventing the concentration 
of power, this model actually results in a situation of expanded government, 
which concentrates power in a field of governmentality that extends across 
the different institutions and processes such that they each become an intrin-
sic component in a self-affecting system of domination and exploitation. For 
James Madison, one the drafters of the United States Constitution, the ideal 
was that government would be balanced by a “diversity and multiplication of 
factions” (Kommers 55), each of which would provide a counterforce to the 
other. What happens often, however, is that the exercise of power becomes 
constrained to this terrain of competing factions.
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Tracing the historical continuity of cacique democracy in the Philippines, 
Benedict Anderson renders national history as the endless narrative of how 
the ruling classes have expropriated from the multitude the surplus of their 
productive capacities and maintained this configuration of hierarchy, domi-
nation, and exploitation. The struggles to more democratically distribute the 
resources of the country, struggles that are caught in the seemingly inescap-
able repetition of a history reduced to trauma and indolence, are assimilated in 
less subversive form into the established order. From Anderson’s perspective, 
upholding the rule of law means preserving the established order, which has 
guaranteed the Filipino oligarchy its political and economic dominance. Seen 
this way, the rule of law becomes an imagined “democratic space,” which af-
fords “room for manoeuvre” to the larger political bodies or factions—such as 
the politicians, the technocrats, the military, the communists, the oligarchy—
that compete with one another for control over the production and exchange 
of resources (Anderson 25). Anderson likens this regime of elite democracy, 
which removes the multitude of Filipinos from the political equation, to the 
regulatory logic of the casino:
In any well-run casino, the tables are managed in the statistical favour of 
the house. To keep drawing customers, the owners must provide them with 
periodic, even spectacular successes. A win is a splendid confirmation of the 
player’s skill and heaven’s favour. A loss demonstrates his/her misfortune or 
ineptitude. Either way, it’s back to the tables as soon as possible. So with the 
blackjack of cacique democracy. Each local triumph for reform promises a 
rentier future; each loss signals miscalculations or ill luck. At the end of the 
week or the year, however, the dealer is always in the black. (30)
The apparent unpredictability of gambling in the casino is paralleled with 
the perceived contingency of participating in Philippine democracy, where 
every Filipino seems to be embraced with the promise of equal freedom and 
opportunity. Any ordinary citizen can run for political office in local and 
elections where a large majority regularly votes. The uncensored national 
media are allowed free rein to dictate the news agenda even if the issues ad-
dressed may be unfavorable to the state. Democracy in the Philippines bears 
only the semblance of vibrancy, however. According to Anderson’s account, 
although many ordinary Filipinos may be dissatisfied with the unchanging 
reality that a privileged minority has more wealth and power than they do, 
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they are assuaged and contented by the few opportunities they are granted for 
improving their lives. Hope arrives in the form of reforms made to the system, 
which fail more often than they succeed. Because such concessions belong to 
the reproductive mechanisms of the established order, they never threaten its 
existence. This semblance of democracy reinforces the prevailing structures 
of hierarchy, domination, and exploitation by concealing them:
It disperses power horizontally, while concentrating it vertically; and the for-
mer draws a partial veil over the latter… Precisely the competition is violently 
real, it is easy to be persuaded to cheer for, as it were, Arsenal or Chelsea, 
without reflecting too hard on the fact that both are in the First Division, 
and that one is watching the match from the outer stands, not playing in it. 
(Anderson 31)
Using a football analogy, Anderson exposes the logic of exclusion that regu-
lates Philippine politics. As the responsibility for directing the country’s fu-
ture is transferred to a vanguard of leaders and intellectuals, political action 
is limited to a privileged minority while the rest of the populace is excluded 
from transforming the conditions of reality.
Instead of being “circulating and relational,” the exercise of power is “sup-
pressed” and “congealed” (Brown 112) in conflicting political institutions and 
factions. In this prevalent situation, the desire of the multitude of Filipinos 
for democracy can only be articulated and recognized as constitutional rights 
claims, which affirm the transcendent authority of the state and the law and 
restrict the exercise of power to language and legality. Through its inscription 
in a governmental system of domination and exploitation, the mode of justice 
that can overcome the culture of impunity becomes the means of containing 
the productive capacities of the multitude for autonomy and transformation. 
If a People Power revolution were to intervene in the legitimization and repro-
duction of the system as an immanent event of historical alterity, it would not 
simply introduce modifications to the leadership or machinery of the prevail-
ing governmental regime but engage in the transformation of the very culture 
of everyday life that perpetuates the established order of elite democracy. 
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